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Abstract Functional specifications describe what program components can do:
the sufficient conditions to invoke a component’s operations. They allow us to
reason about the use of components in the closed world setting, where the com-
ponent interacts with known client code, and where the client code must establish
the appropriate pre-conditions before calling into the component.
Sufficient conditions are not enough to reason about the use of components in
the open world setting, where the component interacts with external code, pos-
sibly of unknown provenance, and where the component itself may evolve over
time. In this open world setting, we must also consider the necessary conditions,
i.e. what are the conditions without which an effect will not happen. In this paper
we propose a language Chainmail for writing holistic specifications that focus
on necessary conditions (as well as sufficient conditions). We give a formal se-
mantics for Chainmail, and the core of Chainmail has been mechanised in the
Coq proof assistant.
1 Introduction
Software guards our secrets, our money, our intellectual property, our reputation [47].
We entrust personal and corporate information to software which works in an open
world, where it interacts with third party software of unknown provenance, possibly
buggy and potentially malicious.
This means we need our software to be robust: to behave correctly even if used by
erroneous or malicious third parties. We expect that our bank will only make payments
from our account if instructed by us, or by somebody we have authorised, that space on
a web given to an advertiser will not be used to obtain access to our bank details [43],
or that a concert hall will not book the same seat more than once.
While language mechanisms such as constants, invariants, object capabilities [40],
and ownership [15] make it possible to write robust programs, they cannot ensure that
programs are robust. Ensuring robustness is difficult because it means different things
for different systems: perhaps that critical operations should only be invoked with the
requisite authority; perhaps that sensitive personal information should not be leaked;
or perhaps that a resource belonging to one user should not be consumed by another.
To ensure robustness, we need ways to specify what robustness means for a particular
program, and ways to demonstrate that the particular program adheres to its specific
robustness requirements.
Consider the code snippets from Fig. 1. Objects of class Safe hold a treasure
and a secret, and only the holder of the secret can remove the treasure from the safe.
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class Safe{
field treasure
field secret
method take(scr){
if (secret==scr) then
{
t=treasure
treasure = null
return t } }
}
class Safe{
field treasure
field secret
method take(scr){
...as version 1 ...
}
method set(scr){
secret=scr }
}
Figure 1. Two Versions of the class Safe
We show the code in two versions; both have the same method take, and the second
version has an additional method set. We assume a dynamically typed language (so
that our results are applicable to the statically as well as the dynamically typed setting);
3 that fields are private in the sense of Java (i.e. only methods of that class may read
or write these fields); and that addresses are unforgeable (so there is no way to guess a
secret). A classical Hoare triple describing the behaviour of take would be:
(ClassicSpec) ,
method take(scr)
PRE: this:Safe
POST: scr=this.secretpre −→ this.treasure=null
∧
scr 6=this.secretpre −→ ∀s:Safe.s.treasure=s.treasurepre
(ClassicSpec) expresses that knowledge of the secret is sufficient to remove the
treasure, and that take cannot remove the treasure unless the secret is provided. But
it cannot preclude that Safe – or some other class, for that matter – contains more
methods which might make it possible to remove the treasure without knowledge of the
secret. This is the problem with the second version of Safe: it satisfies (ClassicSpec),
but is not robust, as it is possible to overwrite the secret of the Safe and then use
it to remove the treasure. To express robustness requirements, we introduce holistic
specifications, and require that:
(HolisticSpec) ,
∀s.[ s : Safe ∧ s.treasure 6= null ∧ will〈s.treasure = null 〉
−→ ∃o.[ external〈o 〉∧〈o accesss.secret 〉 ] ]
(HolisticSpec) mandates that for any safe s whose treasure is not null, if some
time in the future its treasure were to become null, then at least one external object
(i.e. an object whose class is not Safe) in the current configuration has direct access
to s’s secret. This external object need not have caused the change in s.treasure
but it would have (transitively) passed access to the secret which ultimately did cause
that change. Both classes in Fig. 1 satisfy (ClassicSpec), but the second version does
not satisfy (HolisticSpec).
3 We do not depend on the additional safety static typing provides, so we only assume a dynam-
ically typed language.
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In this paper we propose Chainmail, a specification language to express holistic
specifications. The design of Chainmail was guided by the study of a sequence of
examples from the object-capability literature and the smart contracts world: the mem-
brane [18], the DOM [21,59], the Mint/Purse [40], the Escrow [19], the DAO [13,16]
and ERC20 [61]. As we worked through the examples, we found a small set of language
constructs that let us write holistic specifications across a range of different contexts.
Chainmail extends traditional program specification languages [31,37] with features
which talk about:
Permission: Which objects may have access to which other objects; this is central
since access to an object grants access to the functions it provides.
Control: Which objects called functions on other objects; this is useful in identifying
the causes of certain effects - eg funds can only be reduced if the owner called a
payment function.
Time: What holds some time in the past, the future, and what changes with time,
Space: Which parts of the heap are considered when establishing some property, or
when performing program execution; a concept related to, but different from, memory
footprints and separation logics,
Viewpoint: Which objects and which configurations are internal to our component,
and which are external to it; a concept related to the open world setting.
While many individual features of Chainmail can be found in other work, their
power and novelty for specifying open systems lies in their careful combination. The
contributions of this paper are:
– the design of the holistic specification language Chainmail,
– the semantics of Chainmail,
– a Coq mechanisation of the core of Chainmail.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives an example from
the literature which we will use to elucidate key points of Chainmail. 3 presents the
Chainmail specification language. Section 4 introduces the formal model underlying
Chainmail, and then section 5 defines the semantics of Chainmail’s assertions. Sec-
tion 6 discusses our design, 7 considers related work, and section 8 concludes. We
relegate key points of exemplar problems and various details to appendices which are
available at [1].
2 Motivating Example: The Bank
As a motivating example, we consider a simplified banking application taken from
the object capabilities literature [41]: Accounts belong to Banks and hold money
(balances); with access to two Accounts of the same Bank one can transfer any
amount of money from one to the other. This example has the advantage that it requires
several objects and classes.
We will not show the code here (see appendix C), but suffice it to say that class
Account has methods deposit(src, amt) and makeAccount(amt) (i.e. a
method called deposit with two arguments, and a method called makeAccount
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with one argument). Similarly, Bank has method newAccount(amt). Moreover,
deposit requires that the receiver and first argument (this and src) are Accounts
and belong to the same bank, that the second argument (amt) is a number, and that
src’s balance is at least amt. If this condition holds, then amt gets transferred from
src to the receiver. The function makeNewAccount returns a fresh Account with
the same bank, and transfers amt from the receiver Account to the new Account.
Finally, the function newAccount when run by a Bank creates a new Account with
corresponding amount of money in it.4 It is not difficult to give formal specifications
of these methods in terms of pre- and post-conditions.
However, what if the bank provided a steal method that emptied out every ac-
count in the bank into a thief’s account? The critical problem is that a bank implement-
ation including a stealmethod could meet the functional specifications of deposit,
makeAccount, and newAccount, and still allow the clients’ money to be stolen.
One obvious solution would be to adopt a closed-world interpretation of specifica-
tions: we interpret functional specifications as exact in the sense that only implementa-
tions that meet the functional specification exactly, with no extra methods or behaviour,
are considered as suitable implementations of the functional specification. The prob-
lem is that this solution is far too strong: it would for example rule out a bank that
during software maintenance was given a new method count that simply counted the
number of deposits that had taken place, or a method notify to enable the bank to
occasionally send notifications to its customers.
What we need is some way to permit bank implementations that send notifications
to customers, but to forbid implementations of steal. The key here is to capture the
(implicit) assumptions underlying the design of the banking application. We provide
additional specifications that capture those assumptions. The following three informal
requirements prevent methods like steal:
1. An account’s balance can be changed only if a client calls the deposit method
with the account as the receiver or as an argument.
2. An account’s balance can be changed only if a client has access to that particular
account.
3. The Bank/Account component does not leak access to existing accounts or banks.
Compared with the functional specification we have seen so far, these requirements
capture necessary rather than sufficient conditions: Calling the deposit method to
gain access to an account is necessary for any change to that account taking place.
The function steal is inconsistent with requirement (1), as it reduces the balance of
an Account without calling the function deposit. However, requirement (1) is not
enough to protect our money. We need to (2) to avoid an Account’s balance getting
modified without access to the particular Account, and (3) to ensure that such accesses
are not leaked.
We can express these requirements through Chainmail assertions. Rather than spe-
cifying the behaviour of particular methods when they are called, we write assertions
that range across the entire behaviour of the Bank/Account module.
4 Note that our very limited bank specification doesn’t even have the concept of an account
owner.
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(1) , ∀a.[ a : Account ∧ changes〈a.balance 〉 −→
∃o.[ 〈o callsa.deposit( _, _) 〉 ∨ 〈o calls _.deposit( a, _) 〉 ] ]
(2) , ∀a.∀S : Set. [ a : Account∧ 〈will〈 changes〈a.balance 〉 〉 inS 〉 −→
∃o. [o ∈ S ∧ external〈o 〉 ∧ 〈o accessa 〉 ] ]
(3) , ∀a.∀S : Set. [ a : Account∧ 〈will〈 ∃o.[ external〈o 〉 ∧ 〈o accessa 〉] 〉 inS 〉
−→ ∃o′. [o′ ∈ S ∧ external〈o′ 〉 ∧ 〈o′ accessa 〉 ] ]
In the above and throughout the paper, we use an underscore (_) to indicate an existen-
tially bound variable whose value is of no interest.
Assertion (1) says that if an account’s balance changes (changes〈a.balance 〉),
then there must be some client object o that called the deposit method with a as a
receiver or as an argument (〈o calls _.deposit( _) 〉).
Assertion (2) similarly constrains any possible change to an account’s balance: If at
some future point the balance changes (will〈 changes〈 ... 〉 〉), and if this future change is
observed with the state restricted to the objects from S (i.e. 〈 ... inS 〉), then at least one
of these objects (o ∈ S) is external to the Bank/Account system (external〈o 〉) and
has (direct) access to that account object (〈o accessa 〉). Notice that while the change
in the balance happens some time in the future, the external object o has access to
a in the current state. Notice also, that the object which makes the call to deposit
described in (1), and the object which has access to a in the current state described in
(2) need not be the same: It may well be that the latter passes a reference to a to the
former (indirectly), which then makes the call to deposit.
It remains to think about how access to an Account may be obtained. This is the
remit of assertion (3): It says that if at some time in the future of the state restricted to
S, some object o which is external has access to some account a, and if a exists in the
current state, then in the current state some object from S has access to a. Where o and
o′ may, but need not, be the same object. And where o′ has to exist and have access to
a in the current state, but o need not exist in the current state – it may be allocated later.
Assertion (3) thus gives essential protection when dealing with foreign, untrusted code.
When an Account is given out to untrusted third parties, assertion (3) guarantees that
this Account cannot be used to obtain access to further Accounts.
A holistic specification for the bank account, then, would be a sufficient functional
specification plus the necessary specifications (1)-(3) from above. This holistic specific-
ation permits an implementation of the bank that also provides count and notify
methods, even though the specification does not mention either method. Critically,
though, the Chainmail specification does not permit an implementation that includes
a steal method.
3 Chainmail Overview
In this Section we give a brief and informal overview of some of the most salient fea-
tures of Chainmail– a full exposition appears in Section 5.
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Example Configurations We will illustrate these features using the Bank/Account ex-
ample from the previous Section. We use the runtime configurations σ1 and σ2 shown
in the left and right diagrams in Figure 2. In both diagrams the rounded boxes de-
pict objects: green for those from the Bank/Account component, and grey for the
“external”, “client” objects. The transparent green rectangle shows which objects are
contained by the Bank/Account component. The object at 1 is a Bank, those at 2,
3 and 4 are Accounts, and those at 91, 92, 93 and 94 are “client” objects which
belong to classes different from those from the Bank/Account module.
Each configuration represents one alternative implementation of the Bank object.
Configuration σ1 may arise from execution using a module MBA1, where Account
objects have a field myBank pointing to their Bank, and an integer field balance –
the code can be found in appendix C Fig. 6. Configuration σ2 may arise from execution
using a module MBA2, where Accounts have a myBank field, Bank objects have a
ledger implemented though a sequence of Nodes, each of which has a field point-
ing to an Account, a field balance, and a field next – the code can be found in
appendix C Figs. 9 and 7.
σ1
1:Bank
91 : …
92 : …
2:Acc 3:Acc 4:Acc
94 : …
93: …
σ2
1:Bank
91 : …
92 : …
2:Acc 3:Acc 4:Acc
94 : …
93: …
10:Nd 12:Nd11:Nd
Figure 2. Two runtime configurations for the Bank/Account example.
For the rest, assume variable identifiers b1, and a2–a4, and u91–u94 denoting objects
1, 2–4, and 91–94 respectively for both σ1 and σ2. That is, for i=1 or i=2, σi(b1)=1,
σi(a2)=2, σi(a3)=3, σi(a4)=4, σi(u91)=91, σi(u92)=92, σi(u93)=93, and σi(u94)=94.
Classical Assertions talk about the contents of the local variables (i.e. the topmost stack
frame), and the fields of the various objects (i.e. the heap). For example, the assertion
a2.myBank=a3.myBank, says that a2 and a3 have the same bank. In fact, this asser-
tion is satisfied in both σ1 and σ2, written formally as
..., σ1 |= a2.myBank = a3.myBank
..., σ2 |= a2.myBank = a3.myBank.
The term x:ClassId says that x is an object of class ClassId. For example
..., σ1 |= a2.myBank : Bank.
We support ghost fields [12,31], e.g.a1.balance is a physical field in σ1 and a
ghost field in σ2 since in MBA2 an Account does not store its balance (as can be
seen in appendix C Fig. 9). We also support the usual logical connectives, and so, we
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can express assertions such as
∀a.[ a : Account −→ a.myBank : Bank ∧ a.balance ≥ 0 ] .
Permission: Access Our first holistic assertion, 〈x accessy 〉, asserts that object x has
a direct reference to another object y: either one of x’s fields contains a reference to y,
or the receiver of the currently executing method is x, and y is one of the arguments or
a local variable. For example:
..., σ1 |= 〈a2 accessb1 〉
If σ1 were executing the method body corresponding to the call a2.deposit(a3,360),
then we would have
..., σ1 |= 〈a2 accessa3 〉,
Namely, during execution of deposit, the object at a2 has access to the object at a3,
and could, if the method body chose to, call a method on a3 , or store a reference to a3
in its own fields. Access is not symmetric, nor transitive:
..., σ1 6|= 〈a3 accessa2 〉,
..., σ2 |= 〈a2 access∗ a3 〉, ..., σ2 6|= 〈a2 accessa3 〉.
Control: Calls The assertion 〈x callsm.y( zs) 〉 holds in configurations where a method
on object x makes a method call y.m(zs) — that is it calls method m with object y as
the receiver, and with arguments zs. For example,
..., σ3 |= 〈x callsa2.deposit( a3,360) 〉.
means that the receiver in σ3 is x, and that a2.deposit(a3,360) is the next state-
ment to be executed.
Space: In The space assertion 〈A inS 〉 establishes validity of A in a configuration re-
stricted to the objects from the set S. For example, if object 94 is included in S1 but not
in S2, then we have
..., σ1 |= 〈 (∃o. 〈o accessa4 〉) inS1 〉
..., σ1 6|= 〈 (∃o. 〈o accessa4 〉) inS2 〉.
The set S in the assertion 〈A inS 〉 is therefore not the footprint of A; it is more like
the fuel[3] given to establish that assertion. Note that ..., σ |= 〈A inS 〉 does not im-
ply ..., σ |= A nor does it imply ..., σ |= 〈A inS ∪ S′ 〉. The other direction of the
implication does not hold either.
Time: Next, Will, Prev, Was We support several operators from temporal logic: (next〈A 〉,
will〈A 〉, prev〈A 〉, and was〈A 〉) to talk about the future or the past in one or more steps.
The assertion will〈A 〉 expresses thatAwill hold in one or more steps. For example, tak-
ing σ4 to be similar to σ2, the next statement to be executed to be a2.deposit(a3,360),
and MBA2 # ..., σ4 |= a2.balance = 60, and that MBA2 # ..., σ4 |= a4.balance ≥
360, then
MBA2 # ..., σ4 |= will〈a2.balance = 420 〉.
The internal module, MBA2 is needed for looking up the method body of deposit.
Viewpoint: – External The assertion external〈x 〉 expresses that the object at x does
not belong to the module under consideration. For example,
MAB2 # ..., σ2 |= external〈u92 〉, MAB2 # ..., σ2 6|= external〈a2 〉,
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MAB2 # ..., σ2 6|= external〈b1.ledger 〉
The internal module, MBA2, is needed to judge which objects are internal or external.
Change and Authority: We have used changes〈 ... 〉 in our Chainmail assertions in
section 2, as in changes〈a.balance 〉. Assertions that talk about change, or give con-
ditions for change to happen are fundamental for security; the ability to cause change is
called authority in [40]. We could encode change using the other features of Chainmail,
namely, for any expression e:
changes〈e 〉 ≡ ∃v.[ e = v ∧ next〈 ¬(e = v) 〉 ].
and similarly for assertions.
Putting these together We now look at some composite assertions which use several
features from above. The assertion below says that if the statement to be executed is
a2.deposit(a3,60), then the balance of a2 will eventually change:
MBA2#..., σ2 |= 〈 .. callsa2.deposit( a3,60) 〉 −→ will〈 changes〈a2.balance 〉 〉.
Now look deeper into space assertions, 〈A inS 〉: They allow us to characterise
the set of objects which have authority over certain effects (here A). In particular, the
assertion 〈will〈A 〉 inS 〉 requires two things: i) that A will hold in the future, and ii)
that the objects which cause the effect which will make A valid, are included in S.
Knowing who has, and who has not, authority over properties or data is a fundamental
concern of robustness [40]. Notice that the authority is a set, rather than a single object:
quite often it takes several objects in concert to achieve an effect.
Consider assertions (2) and (3) from the previous section. They both have the form
“will〈 〈A inS 〉 〉 −→ P (S)”, where P is some property over a set. These assertions
say that if ever in the future A becomes valid, and if the objects involved in making A
valid are included in S, then S must satisfy P . Such assertions can be used to restrict
whether A will become valid. If we have some execution which only involves objects
which do not satisfy P , then we know that the execution will not ever make A valid.
In summary, in addition to classical logical connectors and classical assertions over the
contents of the heap and the stack, our holistic assertions draw from some concepts from
object capabilities (〈 _ access _ 〉 for permission; 〈 _ calls _._( _) 〉 and changes〈 _ 〉 for
authority) as well as temporal logic (will〈A 〉, was〈A 〉 and friends), and the relation of
our spatial connective (〈A inS 〉) with ownership and effect systems [60,15,14].
The next two sections discuss the semantics of Chainmail. Section 4 contains an
overview of the formal model and section 5 focuses on the most important part of
Chainmail: assertions.
4 Overview of the Formal foundations
We now give an overview of the formal model for Chainmail. In section 4.1 we intro-
duce the shape of the judgments used to give semantics to Chainmail, while in section
4.2 we describe the most salient aspects of an underlying programming language used
in Chainmail.
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4.1 Chainmail judgments
Having outlined the ingredients of our holistic specification language, the next question
to ask is: When does a module M satisfy a holistic assertion A? More formally: when
does M |= A hold?
Our answer has to reflect the fact that we are dealing with an open world, where
M, our module, may be linked with arbitrary untrusted code. To model the open world,
we consider pairs of modules, M # M′, where M is the module whose code is supposed to
satisfy the assertion, and M′ is another module which exercises the functionality of M.
We call our module M the internal module, and M′ the external module, which represents
potential attackers or adversaries.
We can now answer the question: M |= A holds if for all further, potentially ad-
versarial, modules M′ and in all runtime configurations σ which may be observed as
arising from the execution of the code of M combined with that of M′, the assertion A is
satisfied. More formally, we define:
M |= A if ∀M′.∀σ ∈ Arising(M # M′).[ M # M′, σ |= A ].
Module M′ represents all possible clients of M. As it is arbitrarily chosen, it reflects the
open world nature of our specifications.
The judgement M # M′, σ |= A means that assertion A is satisfied by M # M′ and σ. As
in traditional specification languages [31,37], satisfaction is judged in the context of a
runtime configuration σ; but in addition, it is judged in the context of the internal and
external modules. These are used to find abstract functions defining ghost fields as well
as method bodies needed when judging validity of temporal assertions such as will〈 _ 〉.
We distinguish between internal and external modules. This has two uses: First,
Chainmail includes the “external〈o 〉” assertion to require that an object belongs to the
external module, as in the Bank Account’s assertion (2) and (3) in section 2. Second, we
adopt a version of visible states semantics [45,25,38], treating all executions within a
module as atomic. We only record runtime configurations which are external to module
M, i.e. those where the executing object (i.e. the current receiver) comes from module
M′. Execution has the form
M # M′, σ ; σ′
where we ignore all intermediate steps with receivers internal to M. In the next section
we shall outline the underlying programming language, and define the judgment M #
M′, σ ; σ′ and the set Arising(M # M′).
4.2 An underlying programming language, Loo
The meaning of Chainmail assertions is parametric with an underlying object-oriented
programming language, with modules as repositories of code, classes with fields, meth-
ods and ghostfields, objects described by classes, a way to link modules into larger ones,
and a concept of program execution.5
We have developed Loo, a minimal such object-oriented language, which we out-
line in this section. We describe the novel aspects of Loo„ and summarise the more
conventional parts, relegating full, and mostly unsurprising, definitions to Appendix A,
5 We believe that Chainmail can be applied to any language with these features.
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Modules are central to Loo, as they are to Chainmail. As modules are repositories
of code, we adopt the common formalisation of modules as maps from class identifiers
to class definitions, c.f. Appendix, Def. 11. We use the terms module and component
in an analogous manner to class and object respectively. Loo is untyped – this has sev-
eral reasons: Many popular programming languages are untyped. The external module
might be untyped, and so it is more general to consider everything as untyped. Finally,
a solution that works for an untyped language will also apply to a typed language;’ the
converse is not true.
Class definitions consist of field, method and ghost field declarations, c.f. Appendix,
Def. 12. Method bodies are sequences of statements, which can be field read or field
assignments, object creation, method calls, and return statements. Fields are private in
the sense of C++: they can only be read or written by methods of the current class. This
is enforced by the operational semantics, c.f. Fig. 4. We discuss ghost fields in the next
section.
Runtime configurations, σ, contain all the usual information about execution snap-
shots: the heap, and a stack of frames. Each frame consists of a continuation, contn,
describing the remaining code to be executed by the frame, and a map from variables
to values. Values are either addresses or sets of addresses; the latter are needed to deal
with assertions which quantify over sets of objects, as e.g. (1) and (2) from section 2.
We define one-module execution through a judgment of the form M, σ ; σ′ in the
Appendix, Fig. 4.
We define a module linking operator ◦ so that M◦M′ is the union of the two modules,
provided that their domains are disjoint, c.f. Appendix, Def. 18. As we said in section
4.1, we distinguish between the internal and external module. We consider execution
from the view of the external module, and treat execution of methods from the internal
module as atomic. For this, we define two-module execution based on one-module exe-
cution as follows:
Definition 1. Given runtime configurations σ, σ′, and a module-pair M # M′ we define
execution where M is the internal, and M′ is the external module as below:
– M # M′, σ ; σ′ if there exist n ≥ 2 and runtime configurations σ1, ... σn, such
that
• σ=σ1, and σn = σ′.
• M◦M′, σi ; σ′i+1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1
• Class(this)σ 6∈ dom(M), and Class(this)σ′ 6∈ dom(M),
• Class(this)σi ∈ dom(M), for 2 ≤ i ≤ n−2
In the definition above, Class(x)σ looks up the class of the object stored at x, c.f.
Appendix, Def. 15. For example, for σ4 as in Section 3 whose next statement to be ex-
ecuted is a2.deposit(a3,360), we would have a sequence of configurations σ41,
... σ4n, σ5 so that the one-module execution gives MBA2, σ4 ; σ41 ; σ42... ;
σ4n ; σ5. This would correspond to an atomic evaluation in the two-module exe-
cution: MBA2 # M′, σ4 ; σ5 (see Fig.3; where blue stands for σ(this) ∈ M1,and
orange for σ(this)∈M2).
Two-module execution is related to visible states semantics [45] as they both filter
configurations, with the difference that in visible states semantics execution is unfiltered
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 5 6 7 9
1 3 4 8
b)
a)
c)
Figure 3. Two Module Execution (Def. 1). a) M1◦M2 b) M1 # M2 c) M2 # M1
and configurations are only filtered when it comes to the consideration of class invari-
ants while two-module execution filters execution. The lemma below says that linking
is associative and commutative, and preserves both one-module and two-module exe-
cution.
Lemma 1 (Properties of linking). For any modules M, M′, M′′, and M′′′ and runtime
configurations σ, and σ′ we have:
– (M◦M′)◦M′′ = M◦(M′◦M′′) and M◦M′ = M′◦M.
– M, σ ; σ′, and M◦M′ is defined, implies M◦M′, σ ; σ′.
– M # M′, σ ; σ′ implies (M◦M′′) # (M′◦M′′′), σ ; σ′.
We can now answer the question as to which runtime configurations are pertinent
when judging a module’s adherence to an assertion. Initial configurations, are those
whose heap have only one object, of class Object, and whose stack have one frame,
with arbitrary continuation. Arising configurations are those that can be reached by
two-module execution, starting from any initial configuration.
Definition 2 (Initial and Arising Configurations). are defined as follows:
– Initial〈(ψ, χ)〉, if ψ consists of a single frame φ with dom(φ) = {this},
and there exists some address α, such that bthiscφ=α, and dom(χ)=α, and
χ(α) = (Object, ∅).
– Arising(M # M′) = { σ | ∃σ0. [ Initial〈σ0〉 ∧ M # M′, σ0 ;∗ σ ] }
5 Assertions
Chainmail assertions (details in appendix B.3) consist of (pure) expressions e, com-
parisons between expressions, classical assertions about the contents of heap and stack,
the usual logical connectives, as well as our holistic concepts. In this section we fo-
cus on the novel, holistic, features of Chainmail (permission, control, time, space, and
viewpoint), as well as our wish to support some form of recursion while keeping the
logic of assertions classical.
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5.1 Satisfaction of Assertions - Access, Control, Space, Viewpoint
Permission expresses that an object has the potential to call methods on another object,
and to do so directly, without help from any intermediary object. This is the case when
the two objects are aliases, or the first object has a field pointing to the second object, or
the first object is the receiver of the currently executing method and the second object
is one of the arguments or a local variable. Interpretations of variables and paths, b...cσ ,
are defined in the usual way (appendix Def. 15).
Definition 3 (Permission). For any modules M, M′, variables x and y, we define
– M # M′, σ |= 〈x accessy 〉 if bxcσ and bycσ are defined, and
• bxcσ=bycσ , or
• bx.fcσ=bycσ , for some field f, or
• bxcσ=bthiscσ and bycσ=bzcσ , for some variable z and z appears in
σ.contn.
In the last disjunct, where z is a parameter or local variable, we ask that z appears in the
code being executed (σ.contn). This requirement ensures that variables which were
introduced into the variable map in order to give meaning to existentially quantified
assertions, are not considered.
Control expresses which object is the process of making a function call on another
object and with what arguments. The relevant information is stored in the continuation
(cont) on the top frame.
Definition 4 (Control). For any modules M, M′, variables x , y, z1, ...zn, we define:
– M # M′, σ |= 〈x callsy.m( z1, ...zn) 〉 if bxcσ , bycσ , bz1cσ , ... bzncσ are
defined, and
• bthiscσ=bxcσ , and
• σ.contn=u.m(v1, ..vn); _, for some u,v1,... vn, and
• bycσ=bucσ , and bzicσ=bvicσ , for all i.
Thus, 〈x callsy.m( z1, ...zn) 〉 expresses the call y.m(z1, ...zn) will be executed next,
and that the caller is x.
Viewpoint is about whether an object is viewed as belonging to the internal mode; this
is determined by the class of the object.
Definition 5 (Viewpoint). For any modules M, M′, and variablex, we define
– M # M′, σ |= external〈x 〉 if bxcσ is defined and Class(bxcσ)σ /∈ dom(M)
– M # M′, σ |= internal〈x 〉 if bxcσ is defined and Class(bxcσ)σ ∈ dom(M)
Space is about asserting that some property A holds in a configuration whose objects
are restricted to those from a give set S. This way we can express that the objects from
the set S have authority over the assertion A. In order to define validity of 〈A inS 〉 in a
configuration σ, we first define a restriction operation, σ↓S which restricts the objects
from σ to only those from S.
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Definition 6 (Restriction of Runtime Configurations). The restriction operator ↓
applied to a runtime configuration σ and a variable S is defined as follows:
– σ↓S , (ψ, χ′), if σ=(ψ, χ), dom(χ′) = bScσ , and ∀α∈dom(χ′).χ(α) = χ′(α).
For example, if we take σ2 from Fig.
2 in Section 2, and restrict it with
some set S4 such that bS4cσ2 =
{91, 1, 2, 3, 4, 11}, then the restriction
σ2↓S4 will look as on the right.
1:Bank
91 : …
2:Acc 3:Acc 4:Acc
11:Nd
Note in the diagram above the dangling pointers at objects 1, 11, and 91 - remin-
iscent of the separation of heaps into disjoint subheaps, as provided by the ∗ operator
in separation logic [53]. The difference is, that in separation logic, the separation is
provided through the assertions, where A ∗A′ holds in any heap which can be split into
disjoint χ and χ′ where χ satisfiesA and χ′ satisfiesA′. That is, inA∗A′ the split of the
heap is determined by the assertions A and A′ and there is an implicit requirement of
disjointness, while in σ↓S the split is determined by S, and no disjointness is required.
We now define the semantics of 〈A inS 〉.
Definition 7 (Space). For any modules M, M′, assertions A and variable S, we define:
– M # M′, σ |= 〈A inS 〉 if M # M′, σ↓S |= A.
The set S in the assertion 〈A inS 〉 is related to framing from implicit dynamic
frames [57]: in an implicit dynamic frames assertion accx.f ∗ A, the frame x.f
prescrives which locations may be used to determine validity of A. The difference is
that frames are sets of locations (pairs of address and field), while our S-es are sets of
addresses. More importantly, implicit dynamic frames assertions whose frames are not
large enough are badly formed, while in our work, such assertions are allowed and may
hold or not, e.g.MBA2 # M′, σ |= ¬ 〈 (∃n.a2.balance = n) inS4 〉.
5.2 Satisfaction of Assertions - Time
To deal with time, we are faced with four challenges: a) validity of assertions in the
future or the past needs to be judged in the future configuration, but using the bindings
from the current one, b) the current configuration needs to store the code being executed,
so as to be able to calculate future configurations, c) when considering the future, we
do not want to observe configurations which go beyond the frame currently at the top of
the stack, d) there is no "undo" operator to deterministically enumerate all the previous
configurations.
Consider challenge a) in some more detail: the assertion will〈x.f = 3 〉 is satisfied
in the current configuration, σ1, if in some future configuration, σ2, the field f of the
object that is pointed at by x in the current configuration (σ1) has the value 3, that is, if
bbxcσ1 .fcσ2 = 3, even if in that future configuration x denotes a different object (i.e. if
bxcσ1 6= bxcσ2 ). To address this, we define an auxiliary concept: the operator/, where
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σ1/ σ2 adapts the second configuration to the top frame’s view of the former: it returns
a new configuration whose stack comes from σ2 but is augmented with the view from
the top frame from σ1 and where the continuation has been consistently renamed,. This
allows us to interpret expressions in σ2 but with the variables bound according to σ1;
e.g. we can obtain that value of x in configuration σ2 even if x was out of scope in σ2.
Definition 8 (Adaptation). For runtime configurations σ1, σ2.:
– σ1/σ2 , (φ3 · ψ2, χ2) if
• φ3 = (contn2[zs2/zs′], β2[zs′ 7→ β2(zs2)][zs1 7→ β1(zs1)] ), where
• σ1 = (φ1 · _, _), σ2 = (φ2 ·ψ2, χ2), φ1=(_, β1), φ2=(contn2, β2), and
• zs1=dom(β1), zs2=dom(β2), and
• zs′ is a set of variables with the same cardinality as zs2, and all variables in
zs′ are fresh in β1 and in β2.
That is, in the new frame φ2 from above, we keep the same continuation as from
σ2 but rename all variables with fresh names zs′, and combine the variable map β1
from σ1 with the variable map β2 from σ2 while avoiding names clashes through the
renaming [zs′ 7→ β2(zs2)]. The consistent renaming of the continuation allows the
correct modelling of execution (as needed, for the semantics of nested time assertions,
as e.g. in will〈x.f = 3 ∧ will〈x.f = 5 〉 〉).
Having addressed challenge a) we turn our attention to the remaining challenges:
We address challenge b) by storing the remaining code to be executed in cntn in each
frame. We address challenge c) by only taking the top of the frame when considering
future executions. Finally, we address challenge d) by considering only configurations
which arise from initial configurations, and which lead to the current configuration.
Definition 9 (Time Assertions). For any modules M, M′, and assertion A we define
– M # M′, σ |= next〈A 〉 if ∃σ′. [ M # M′, φ; σ′ ∧ M # M′, σ/σ′ |= A ],
and where φ is so that σ=(φ · _, _).
– M # M′, σ |= will〈A 〉 if ∃σ′. [ M # M′, φ;∗ σ′ ∧ M # M′, σ/σ′ |= A ],
and where φ is so that σ=(φ · _, _).
– M # M′, σ |= prev〈A 〉 if ∀σ1, σ2.[ Initial〈σ1〉 ∧ M # M′, σ1 ;∗ σ2
∧ M#M′, σ2 ; σ −→ M#M′, σ/σ2 |= A ]
– M # M′, σ |= was〈A 〉 if ∀σ1.[ Initial〈σ1〉 ∧ M # M′, σ1 ;∗ σ −→
( ∃σ2.M # M′, σ1 ;∗ σ2 ∧ M # M′, σ2 ;∗ σ ∧ M # M′, σ/σ2 |= A )]
In general, will〈 〈A inS 〉 〉 is different from 〈will〈A 〉 inS 〉. Namely, in the former
assertion, S must contain the objects involved in reaching the future configuration as
well as the objects needed to then establish validity of A in that future configuration. In
the latter assertion, S need only contain the objects needed to establish A in that future
configuration. For example, revisit Fig. 2, and take S1 to consist of objects 1, 2, 4, 93,
and 94, and S2 to consist of objects 1, 2, 4. Assume that σ5 is like σ1, that the next
call in σ5 is a method on u94, whose body obtains the address of a4 (by making a call
on 93 to which it has access), and the address of a2 (to which it has access), and then
makes the call a2.deposit(a4, 360). Assume also that a4’s balance is 380. Then
MBA1 # ..., σ5 |= 〈will〈 changes〈a2.balance 〉 〉 inS1 〉
MBA1 # ..., σ5 6|= 〈will〈 changes〈a2.balance 〉 〉 inS2 〉
MBA1 # ..., σ5 |= will〈 〈 changes〈a2.balance 〉 inS2 〉 〉
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5.3 Properties of Assertions
We define equivalence of assertions in the usual way: assertionsA andA′are equivalent
if they are satisfied in the context of the same configurations and module pairs – i.e.
A ≡ A′ if ∀σ. ∀M,M′. [ M # M′, σ |= A if and only if M # M′, σ |= A′ ].
We can then prove that the usual equivalences hold, e.g. A ∨ A′ ≡ A′ ∨ A, and
¬(∃x.A) ≡ ∀x.(¬A). Our assertions are classical, e.g.A ∧ ¬A ≡ false, and
M # M′, σ |= A and M # M′, σ |= A→ A′ implies M # M′, σ |= A′. This desirable property
comes at the loss of some expected equivalences, e.g. , in general, e = false and ¬e
are not equivalent. More in Appendix B.
5.4 Modules satisfying assertions
Finally, we define satisfaction of assertions by modules: A module M satisfies an asser-
tion A if for all modules M′, in all configurations arising from executions of M # M′, the
assertion A holds.
Definition 10. For any module M, and assertion A, we define:
– M |= A if ∀M′.∀σ∈Arising(M # M′). M # M′, σ |= A
6 Examplar Driven Design
Examplars The design of Chainmail was guided by the study of a sequence of exem-
plars taken from the object-capability literature and the smart contracts world:
1. Bank [49] - Bank and Account as in Section 2 with two different implementations.
2. ERC20 [61] - Ethereum-based token contract.
3. DAO [13,16] - Ethereum contract for Decentralised Autonomous Organisation.
4. DOM [21,59] - Restricting access to browser Domain Object Model
We present these exemplars as appendices [1]. Our design was also driven by work on
other examples such as the membrane [18], the Mint/Purse [40], and Escrow [19,24].
Model We have constructed a Coq model [2] of the core of the Chainmail specifica-
tion language, along with the underlying Loo language. Our formalism is organised as
follows:
1. TheLoo Language: a class based, object oriented language with mutable references.
2. Chainmail: The full assertion syntax and semantics defined in Definitions 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.
3. Loo Properties: Secondary properties of the loo language that aid in reasoning about
its semantics.
4. Chainmail Properties: The core properties defined on the semantics of Chainmail.
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In the associated appendix (see Appendix G) we list and present the properties of
Chainmail we have formalised in Coq. We have proven that Chainmail obeys much of
the properties of classical logic. While we formalise most of the underlying semantics,
we make several assumptions in our Coq formalism: (i) the law of the excluded middle,
a property that is well known to be unprovable in constructive logics, and (ii) the equal-
ity of variable maps and heaps down to renaming. Coq formalisms often require fairly
verbose definitions and proofs of properties involving variable substitution and renam-
ing, and assuming equality down to renaming saves much effort.
More details of the formal foundations of Chainmail, and the model, are also in
appendices [1].
7 Related Work
Behavioural Specification Languages Hatcliff et al. [26] provide an excellent survey
of contemporary specification approaches. With a lineage back to Hoare logic [28],
Meyer’s Design by Contract [38] was the first popular attempt to bring verification
techniques to object-oriented programs as a “whole cloth” language design in Eiffel.
Several more recent specification languages are now making their way into practical
and educational use, including JML [31], Spec] [5], Dafny [32] and Whiley [51]. Our
approach builds upon these fundamentals, particularly Leino & Shulte’s formulation
of two-state invariants [33], and Summers and Drossopoulou’s Considerate Reason-
ing [58]. In general, these approaches assume a closed system, where modules can be
trusted to cooperate. In this paper we aim to work in an open system where modules’
invariants must be protected irrespective of the behaviour of the rest of the system.
Defensive Consistency In an open world, we cannot rely on the kindness of strangers:
rather we have to ensure our code is correct regardless of whether it interacts with
friends or foes. Attackers “only have to be lucky once” while secure systems “have
to be lucky always” [6]. Miller [39,40] defines the necessary approach as defensive
consistency: “An object is defensively consistent when it can defend its own invariants
and provide correct service to its well behaved clients, despite arbitrary or malicious
misbehaviour by its other clients.” Defensively consistent modules are particularly hard
to design, to write, to understand, and to verify: but they make it much easier to make
guarantees about systems composed of multiple components [46].
Object Capabilities and Sandboxes. Capabilities as a means to support the develop-
ment of concurrent and distributed system were developed in the 60’s by Dennis and
Van Horn [20], and were adapted to the programming languages setting in the 70’s [44].
Object capabilities were first introduced [40] in the early 2000s, and many recent stud-
ies manage to verify safety or correctness of object capability programs. Google’s Caja
[42] applies sandboxes, proxies, and wrappers to limit components’ access to ambient
authority. Sandboxing has been validated formally: Maffeis et al. [35] develop a model
of JavaScript, demonstrate that it obeys two principles of object capability systems and
show how untrusted applications can be prevented from interfering with the rest of the
system. Recent programming languages [27,11,54] including Newspeak [10], Dart [9],
Grace [8,30] and Wyvern [36] have adopted the object capability model.
Holistic Specifications for Robust Programs 17
Verification of Object Capability Programs Murray made the first attempt to formalise
defensive consistency and correctness [46]. Murray’s model was rooted in counterfac-
tual causation [34]: an object is defensively consistent when the addition of untrust-
worthy clients cannot cause well-behaved clients to be given incorrect service. Murray
formalised defensive consistency very abstractly, over models of (concurrent) object-
capability systems in the process algebra CSP [29], without a specification language
for describing effects, such as what it means for an object to provide incorrect service.
Both Miller and Murray’s definitions are intensional, describing what it means for an
object to be defensively consistent.
Drossopoulou and Noble [22,48] have analysed Miller’s Mint and Purse example
[40] and discussed the six capability policies as proposed in [40]. In [23], they sketched
a specification language, used it to specify the six policies from [40], showed that sev-
eral possible interpretations were possible, and uncovered the need for another four fur-
ther policies. They also sketched how a trust-sensitive example (the escrow exchange)
could be verified in an open world [24]. Their work does not support the concepts of
control, time, or space, as in Chainmail, but it offers a primitive expressing trust.
Swasey et al. [21] have deployed powerful theoretical techniques to address similar
problems: They show how step-indexing, Kripke worlds, and representing objects as
state machines with public and private transitions can be used to reason about object
capabilities. Devriese have demonstrated solutions to a range of exemplar problems, in-
cluding the DOM wrapper (replicated in our section F) and a mashup application. Their
distinction between public and private transitions is similar to the distinction between
internal and external objects.
More recently, Swasey et al. [59] designed OCPL, a logic for object capability pat-
terns, that supports specifications and proofs for object-oriented systems in an open
world. They draw on verification techniques for security and information flow: separ-
ating internal implementations (“high values” which must not be exposed to attacking
code) from interface objects (“low values” which may be exposed). OCPL supports de-
fensive consistency (they use the term “robust safety” from the security community [7])
via a proof system that ensures low values can never leak high values to external at-
tackers. This means that low values can be exposed to external code, and the behaviour
of the system is described by considering attacks only on low values. They use that lo-
gic to prove a number of object-capability patterns, including sealer/unsealer pairs, the
caretaker, and a general membrane.
Schaefer et al. [55] have recently added support for information-flow security us-
ing refinement to ensure correctness (in this case confidentiality) by construction. By
enforcing encapsulation, all these approaches share similarity with techniques such as
ownership types [15,50], which also protect internal implementation objects from ac-
cesses that cross encapsulation boundaries. Banerjee and Naumann demonstrated that
these systems enforce representation independence (a property close to “robust safety”)
some time ago [4].
Chainmail differs from Swasey, Schaefer’s, and Devriese’s work in a number of
ways: They are primarily concerned with mechanisms that ensure encapsulation (aka
confinement) while we abstract away from any mechanism via the external〈 〉 predic-
ate. They use powerful mathematical techniques which the users need to understand
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in order to write their specifications, while the Chainmail users only need to under-
stand first order logic and the holistic operators presented in this paper. Finally, none
of these systems offer the kinds of holistic assertions addressing control flow, change,
or temporal operations that are at the core of Chainmail’s approach.
Scilla [56] is a minimalistic typed functional language for writing smart contracts
that compiles to the Ethereum bytecode. Scilla’s semantic model is restricted, assuming
actor based communication and restricting recursion, thus facilitating static analysis of
Scilla contracts, and ensuring termination. Scilla is able to demonstrate that a number
of popular Ethereum contracts avoid type errors, out-of-gas resource failures, and pre-
servation of virtual currency. Scilla’s semantics are defined formally, but have not yet
been represented in a mechanised model.
Finally, the recent VerX tool is able to verify a range of specifications for solidity
contracts automatically [52]. Similar to Chainmail, VerX has a specification language
based on temporal logic. VerX offers three temporal operators (always, once, prev) but
only within a past modality, while Chainmail has two temporal operators, both existen-
tial, but with both past and future modalities. VerX specifications can also include pre-
dicates that model the current invocation on a contract (similar to Chainmail’s “calls”),
can access variables, and compute sums (only) over collections. Chainmail is strictly
more expressive as a specification language, including quantification over objects and
sets (so can compute arbitrary reductions on collections) and of course specifications
for permission (“access”), space (“in”) and viewpoint (“external”) which have no ana-
logues in VerX. Unlike Chainmail, VerX includes a practical tool that has been used
to verify a hundred properties across case studies of twelve Solidity contracts.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have motivated the need for holistic specifications, presented the spe-
cification language Chainmail for writing such specifications, and outlined the formal
foundations of the language. To focus on the key attributes of a holistic specification
language, we have kept Chainmail simple, only requiring an understanding of first
order logic. We believe that the holistic features (permission, control, time, space and
viewpoint), are intuitive concepts when reasoning informally, and were pleased to have
been able to provide their formal semantics in what we argue is a simple manner.
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A Foundations: Programming Language
A.1 Modules and Classes
Loo programs consist of modules, which are repositories of code. Since we study class
based oo languages, in this work, code is represented as classes, and modules are map-
pings from identifiers to class descriptions.
Definition 11 (Modules). We define Module as the set of mappings from identifiers to
class descriptions (the latter defined in Definition 12):
Module , { M | M : Identifier −→ ClassDescr }
Classes, as defined below, consist of field, method definitions and ghost field declar-
ations. Loo is untyped, and therefore fields are declared without types, method signa-
tures and ghost field signatures consist of sequences of parameters without types, and
no return type. Method bodies consist of sequences of statements; these can be field
read or field assignments, object creation, method calls, and return statements. All else,
e.g. booleans, conditionals, loops, can be encoded. Field read or write is only allowed
if the object whose field is being read belongs to the same class as the current method.
This is enforced by the operational semantics, c.f. Fig. 4. Ghost fields are defined as
implicit, side-effect-free functions with zero or more parameters. They are ghost in-
formation, i.e. they are not directly stored in the objects, and are not read/written during
execution. When such a ghostfield is mentioned in an assertion, the corresponding func-
tion is evaluated. More in section B.2. Note that the expressions that make up the bodies
of ghostfield declarations (e) are more complex than the terms that appear in individual
statements.
From now on we expect that the set of field and the set of ghostfields defined in a
class are disjoint.
Definition 12 (Classes). Class descriptions consist of field declarations, method de-
clarations, and ghostfield declarations.
ClassDescr ::= class ClassId { ( FieldDecl )∗ ( MethDecl )∗ ( GhosDecl )∗ }
FieldDecl ::= field f
MethDecl ::= method m( x∗) { Stmts }
Stmts ::= Stmt | Stmt ; Stmts
Stmt ::= x.f:= x | x:= x.f | x:= x.m( x∗) | x:= new C ( x∗) | return x
GhostDecl ::= ghost f( x∗ ) { e }
e ::= true | false | null | x | e=e | if e then e else e | e.f( e∗ )
x, f, m ::= Identifier
where we use metavariables as follows: x ∈ VarId f ∈ FldId m ∈ MethId C ∈
ClassId, and x includes this
We define a method lookup function,M which returns the corresponding method
definition given a class C and a method identifier m, and similarly a ghostfield lookup
function, G
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Definition 13 (Lookup). For a class identifier C and a method identifier m:
M(M,C,m) ,
m ( p1, ...pn) { Stmts}if M(C) = classC { ...methodm ( p1, ...pn) { Stmts} ... } .undefined, otherwise.
G(M,C,f) ,
f ( p1, ...pn) { e}if M(C) = classC { ...ghostm ( p1, ...pn) { e} ... } .undefined, otherwise.
A.2 The Operational Semantics of Loo
We will now define execution of Loo code. We start by defining the runtime entities,
and runtime configurations, σ, which consist of heaps and stacks of frames. The frames
are pairs consisting of a continuation, and a mapping from identifiers to values. The
continuation represents the code to be executed next, and the mapping gives meaning
to the formal and local parameters.
Definition 14 (Runtime Entities). We define addresses, values, frames, stacks, heaps
and runtime configurations.
– We take addresses to be an enumerable set, Addr, and use the identifier α ∈ Addr
to indicate an address.
– Values, v, are either addresses, or sets of addresses or null:
v ∈ {null} ∪ Addr ∪ P(Addr).
– Continuations are either statements (as defined in Definition 12) or a marker, x:=
•, for a nested call followed by statements to be executed once the call returns.
Continuation ::= Stmts | x:= • ; Stmts
– Frames, φ, consist of a code stub and a mapping from identifiers to values:
φ ∈ CodeStub× Ident→ V alue,
– Stacks, ψ, are sequences of frames, ψ ::= φ | φ · ψ.
– Objects consist of a class identifier, and a partial mapping from field identifier to
values:
Object = ClassID× (FieldId→ V alue).
– Heaps, χ, are mappings from addresses to objects: χ ∈ Addr→ Object.
– Runtime configurations, σ, are pairs of stacks and heaps, σ ::= ( ψ, χ ).
Note that values may be sets of addresses. Such values are never part of the execu-
tion of Loo, but are used to give semantics to assertions . Next, we define the interpreta-
tion of variables (x) and field look up (x.f) in the context of frames, heaps and runtime
configurations; these interpretations are used to define the operational semantics and
also the validity of assertions, later on in Definitions 3-7.
Definition 15 (Interpretations). We first define lookup of fields and classes, where α
is an address, and f is a field identifier:
– χ(α,f) , fldMap(α,f) if χ(α) = (_, fldMap).
– Class(α)χ , C if χ(α) = (C, _)
We now define interpretations as follows:
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– bxcφ , φ(x)
– bx.fc(φ,χ) , v, if χ(φ(x)) = (_, fldMap) and fldMap(f)=v
For ease of notation, we also use the shorthands below:
– bxc(φ·ψ,χ) , bxcφ
– bx.fc(φ·ψ,χ) , bx.fc(φ,χ)
– Class(α)(ψ,χ) , Class(α)χ
– Class(x)σ , Class(bxcσ)σ
In the definition of the operational semantics of Loo we use the following notations
for lookup and updates of runtime entities :
Definition 16 (Lookup and update of runtime configurations). We define convenient
shorthands for looking up in runtime entities.
– Assuming that φ is the tuple (stub, varMap), we use the notation φ.contn to
obtain stub.
– Assuming a value v, and that φ is the tuple (stub, varMap), we define φ[contn 7→
stub’] for updating the stub, i.e. (stub’, varMap). We use φ[x 7→ v] for updat-
ing the variable map, i.e. (stub, varMap[x 7→ v]).
– Assuming a heap χ, a value v, and that χ(α) = (C, fieldMap), we use χ[α,f 7→
v] as a shorthand for updating the object, i.e.χ[α 7→ (C, fieldMap[f 7→ v]].
Execution of a statement has the form M, σ ; σ′, and is defined in figure 4.
Definition 17 (Execution). of one or more steps is defined as follows:
– The relation M, σ ; σ′, it is defined in Figure 4.
– M, σ ;∗ σ′ holds, if i) σ=σ′, or ii) there exists a σ′′ such that M, σ ;∗ σ′′ and
M, σ′′ ; σ′.
A.3 Module linking
When studying validity of assertions in the open world we are concerned with whether
the module under consideration makes a certain guarantee when executed in conjunc-
tion with other modules. To answer this, we need the concept of linking other modules
to the module under consideration. Linking,◦ , is an operation that takes two modules,
and creates a module which corresponds to the union of the two. We place some condi-
tions for module linking to be defined: We require that the two modules do not contain
implementations for the same class identifiers,
Definition 18 (Module Linking). The linking operator ◦ : Module × Module −→
Module is defined as follows:
M◦M′ ,
{
M ◦aux M′, if dom(M)∩dom(M′)=∅
undefined otherwise.
and where,
– For all C: (M ◦aux M′)(C) , M(C) if C ∈ dom(M), and M′(C) otherwise.
Some properties of linking are described in lemma 1 in the main text. For the proof,
(1) and (2) follow from Definition 18. (3) follows from 18, and the fact that if a lookup
M is defined for M, then it is also defined for M◦M′ and returns the same method, and
similar result for class lookup.
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methCall_OS
φ.contn = x:= x0.m( x1, ...xn) ; Stmts
bx0cφ = α
M(M, Class(α)χ,m) = m( p1, . . .pn) { Stmts1}
φ′′ = ( Stmts1, ( this 7→ α,p1 7→ bx1cφ, . . .pn 7→ bxncφ ) )
M, ( φ · ψ, χ ) ; ( φ′′ · φ[contn 7→ x:= • ; Stmts] · ψ, χ )
varAssgn_OS
φ.contn = x:= y.f ; Stmts Class(y)σ = Class(this)σ
M, ( φ · ψ, χ ) ; ( φ[contn 7→ Stmts,x 7→ by.fcφ,χ] · ψ, χ )
fieldAssgn_OS
φ.contn = x.f:=y; Stmts Class(x)σ = Class(this)σ
M, ( φ · ψ, χ ) ; ( φ[contn 7→ Stmts] · ψ, χ[bxcφ,f 7→ bycφ,χ] )
objCreate_OS
φ.contn = x:=new C( x1, ...xn) ; Stmts
α new in χ
f1, ..fn are the fields declared in M(C)
M, ( φ · ψ, χ ) ; ( φ[contn 7→ Stmts,x 7→ α ] · ψ, χ[α 7→ (C,f1 7→ bx1cφ, ...fn 7→ bxncφ)] )
return_OS
φ.contn = returnx; Stmts or φ.contn = returnx
φ′.contn = x′:= • ; Stmts′
M, ( φ · φ′ · ψ, χ ) ; ( φ′[contn 7→ Stmts’,x′ 7→ bxcφ] · ψ, χ )
Figure 4. Operational Semantics
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A.4 Module pairs and visible states semantics
A module M adheres to an invariant assertion A, if it satisfies A in all runtime config-
urations that can be reached through execution of the code of M when linked to that of
any other module M′, and which are external to M. We call external to M those configur-
ations which are currently executing code which does not come from M. This allows the
code in M to break the invariant internally and temporarily, provided that the invariant
is observed across the states visible to the external client M′.
We have defined two module execution in the main paper, Def. 1.
In that definition n is allowed to have the value 2. In this case the final bullet is
trivial and there exists a direct, external transition from σ to σ′. Our definition is related
to the concept of visible states semantics, but differs in that visible states semantics
select the configurations at which an invariant is expected to hold, while we select the
states which are considered for executions which are expected to satisfy an invariant.
Our assertions can talk about several states (through the use of the will〈 _ 〉 and was〈 _ 〉
connectives), and thus, the intention of ignoring some intermediate configurations can
only be achieved if we refine the concept of execution.
We have defined initial and arising configurations in Definition 2. Note that there are
infinitely many different initial configurations, they will be differing in the code stored
in the continuation of the unique frame.
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B Foundations: Specification Language
We now define the syntax and semantics of expressions and holistic assertions. The
novel, holistic, features of Chainmail (permission, control, time, space, and view-
point), as well as our wish to support some form of recursion while keeping the logic
of assertions classical, introduced challenges, which we discuss in this section.
B.1 Syntax of Assertions
Definition 19 (Assertions). Assertions consist of (pure) expressions e, classical asser-
tions about the contents of heap/stack, the usual logical connectives, as well as our
holistic concepts.
e ::= true | false | null | x | e = e | if e thene elsee | e.f( e∗ )
A ::= e | e = e | e : ClassId | e ∈ S |
A→ A | A ∧A | A ∨A | ¬A |
∀x.A | ∀S : SET.A | ∃x.A | ∃S : SET.A |
〈x access y 〉 | 〈x callsx.m( x∗) 〉
next〈A 〉 | will〈A 〉 | prev〈A 〉 | was〈A 〉 |
〈S inA 〉 | external〈x 〉
x,f,m ::= Identifier
Expressions support calls with parameters (e.f(e∗)); these are calls to ghostfield
functions. This supports recursion at the level of expressions; therefore, the value of
an expression may be undefined (either because of infinite recursion, or because the
expression accessed undefined fields or variables). Assertions of the form e=e′ are
satisfied only if both e and e′ are defined. Because we do not support recursion at the
level of assertions, assertions from a classical logic (e.g.A ∨ ¬A is a tautology).
We will discuss evaluation of expressions in section B.2, standard assertions about
heap/stack and logical connectives in B.3. We have discussed the treatment of permis-
sion, control, space, and viewpoint in the main text in the Definitions 3-7 in section 5.1
the treatment of time in Definitions 8,9 in the main text, section 5.2, We will discuss
properties of assertions in Lemmas 2-3. The judgement M # M′, σ |= A expresses that A
holds in M # M′ and σ, and while M # M′, σ 6|= A expresses that A does not hold in M # M′
and σ.
B.2 Values of Expressions
The value of an expression is described through judgment M, σ,e ↪→ v, defined in
Figure 5. We use the configuration, σ, to read the contents of the top stack frame (rule
Var_Val) or the contents of the heap (rule Field_Heap_Val). We use the module, M, to
find the ghost field declaration corresponding to the ghost field being used.
The treatment of fields and ghost fields is described in rules Field_Heap_Val,
Field_Ghost_Val and Field_Ghost_Val2. If the field f exists in the heap, then its
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value is returned (Field_Heap_Val). Ghost field reads, on the other hand, have the form
e0.f(e1, ...en), and their value is described in rule Field_Ghost_Val: The lookup func-
tion G (defined in the obvious way in the Appendix, Def.13) returns the expression
constituting the body for that ghost field, as defined in the class of e0. We return that
expression evaluated in a configuration where the formal parameters have been substi-
tuted by the values of the actual parameters.
Ghost fields support recursive definitions. For example, imagine a module M0 with
a class Node which has a field called next, and which had a ghost field last, which
finds the last Node in a sequence and is defined recursively as
if this.next=null then this else this.next.last,
and another ghost field acyclic, which expresses that a sequence is acyclic, defined
recursively as
if this.next=null then true else this.next.acyclic.
The relation ↪→ is partial. For example, assume a configuration σ0 where acyc
points to a Node whose field next has value null, and cyc points to a Node whose
field next has the same value as cyc. Then, M0, σ0, acyc.acyclic ↪→ true, but
we would have no value for M0, σ0, cyc.last ↪→ ..., nor for M0, σ0, cyc.acyclic ↪→
....
Notice also that for an expression of the form e.f, both Field_Heap_Val and Field_Ghost_Val2
could be applicable: rule Field_Heap_Val will be applied if f is a field of the object at
e, while rule Field_Ghost_Val will be applied if f is a ghost field of the object at e.
We expect the set of fields and ghost fields in a given class to be disjoint. This allows
a specification to be agnostic over whether a field is a physical field or just ghost in-
formation. For example, assertions (1) and (2) from section 2 talk about the balance
of an Account. In module MBA1 (Appendix C), where we keep the balances in the
account objects, this is a physical field. In MBA2 (also in Appendix C), where we keep
the balances in a ledger, this is ghost information.
B.3 Satisfaction of Assertions - standard
We now define the semantics of assertions involving expressions, the heap/stack, and lo-
gical connectives. The semantics are unsurprising, except, perhaps the relation between
validity of assertions and the values of expressions.
Definition 20 (Interpretations for simple expressions).
For a runtime configuration, σ, variables x or S, we define its interpretation as
follows:
– bxcσ , φ(x) if σ=(φ · _, _)
– bScσ , φ(S) if σ=(φ · _, _)
– bx.fcσ , χ(bxcσ,f) if σ=(_, χ)
Definition 21 ( Basic Assertions). For modules M, M′, configuration σ, we define:
– M # M′, σ |= e if M, σ,e ↪→ true
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True_Val
M, σ, true ↪→ true
False_Val
M, σ, false ↪→ false
Null_Val
M, σ, null ↪→ null
Var_Val
M, σ,x ↪→ σ(x)
Field_Heap_Val
M, σ,e ↪→ α σ(α,f) = v
M, σ,e.f ↪→ v
Field_Ghost_Val2
M, σ,e.f( ) ↪→ v
M, σ,e.f ↪→ v
Field_Ghost_Val
M, σ,e0 ↪→ α
M, σ,ei ↪→ vi i ∈ {1..n}
G(M, Class(α)σ,f) = f( p1, . . .pn) { e }
M, σ[p1 7→ v1, ....pn 7→ vn],e ↪→W v
M, σ, e0.f( e1, ....en) ↪→ v
If_True_Val
M, σ,e ↪→ true
M, σ,e1 ↪→ v
M, σ, if e then e1 else e2 ↪→ v
If_False_Val
M, σ,e ↪→ false
M, σ,e2 ↪→ v
M, σ, if e then e1 else e2 ↪→ v
Equals_True_Val
M, σ,e1 ↪→ v
M, σ,e2 ↪→ v
M, σ,e1 = e2 ↪→ true
Equals_False_Val
M, σ,e1 ↪→ v
M, σ,e2 ↪→ v′ v 6= v′
M, σ,e1 = e2 ↪→ false
Figure 5. Value of Expressions
– M # M′, σ |= e = e′ if there exists a value v such that M, σ,e ↪→ v and
M, σ,e′ ↪→ v.
– M # M′, σ |= e : ClassId if there exists an address α such that
M, σ,e ↪→ α, and Class(α)σ = ClassId.
– M # M′, σ |= e ∈ S if there exists a value v such that M, σ,e ↪→ v, and
v ∈ bScσ .
Satisfaction of assertions which contain expressions is predicated on termination
of these expressions. Continuing our earlier example, M0 # M′, σ0 |= acyc.acyclic
holds for any M′, while M0 # M′, σ0 |= cyc.acyclic does not hold, and M0 # M′, σ0 |=
cyc.acyclic = false does not hold either. In general, when M # M′, σ |= e holds,
then M # M′, σ |= e = true holds too. But when M # M′, σ |= e does not hold, this does
not imply that M #M′, σ |= e = false holds. Finally, an assertion of the form e0 = e0
does not always hold; for example, M0 # M′, σ0 |= cyc.last = cyc.last does not
hold.
We now define satisfaction of assertions which involve logical connectives and ex-
istential or universal quantifiers, in the standard way:
Definition 22 (Assertions with logical connectives and quantifiers). For modules M,
M′, assertions A, A′, variables x, y, S, and configuration σ, we define:
– M # M′, σ |= ∀S : SET.A if M # M′, σ[Q 7→ R] |= A[S/Q]
for all sets of addresses R ⊆ dom(σ), and all Q free in σ and A.
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– M # M′, σ |= ∃S : SET. A if M # M′, σ[Q 7→ R] |= A[S/Q]
for some set of addresses R ⊆ dom(σ), and Q free in σ and A.
– M # M′, σ |= ∀x.A if σ[z 7→ α] |= A[x/z] for all α ∈ dom(σ), and some z
free in σ and A.
– M # M′, σ |= ∃x.A if M # M′, σ[z 7→ α] |= A[x/z]
for some α ∈ dom(σ), and z free in σ and A.
– M # M′, σ |= A→ A′ if M # M′, σ |= A implies M # M′, σ |= A′
– M # M′, σ |= A ∧A′ if M # M′, σ |= A and M # M′, σ |= A′.
– M # M′, σ |= A ∨A′ if M # M′, σ |= A or M # M′, σ |= A′.
– M # M′, σ |= ¬A if M # M′, σ |= A does not hold.
Satisfaction is not preserved with growing configurations; for example, the assertion
∀x.[ x : Account → x.balance > 100 ] may hold in a smaller configuration, but
not hold in an extended configuration. Nor is it preserved with configurations getting
smaller; consider e.g. ∃x.[ x : Account ∧ x.balance > 100 ].
Again, with our earlier example, M0 # M′, σ0 |= ¬(cyc.acyclic = true) and M0 #
M′, σ0 |= ¬(cyc.acyclic = false), and also M0 # M′, σ0 |= ¬(cyc.last =
cyc.last) hold.
We define equivalence of assertions in the usual sense: two assertions are equivalent
if they are satisfied in the context of the same configurations. Similarly, an assertion
entails another assertion, iff all configurations which satisfy the former also satisfy the
latter.
Definition 23 (Equivalence and entailments of assertions).
– A j A′ if ∀σ. ∀M,M′. [ M # M′, σ |= A implies M # M′, σ |= A′ ].
– A ≡ A′ if A j A′ and A′ j A.
Lemma 2 (Assertions are classical-1). For all runtime configurations σ, assertions A
and A′, and modules M and M′, we have
1. M # M′, σ |= A or M # M′, σ |= ¬A
2. M # M′, σ |= A ∧A′ if and only if M # M′, σ |= A and M # M′, σ |= A′
3. M # M′, σ |= A ∨A′ if and only if M # M′, σ |= A or σ |= A′
4. M # M′, σ |= A ∧ ¬A never holds.
5. M # M′, σ |= A and M # M′, σ |= A→ A′ implies M # M′, σ |= A′.
Proof. The proof of part (1) requires to first prove that for all basic assertions A,
(*) either M # M′, σ |= A or M # M′, σ 6|= A.
We prove this using Definition 21. Then, we prove (*) for all possible assertions, by
induction of the structure of A, and the Definitions 22, and also Definitions 3, 4, 5, 7,
and 9. Using the definition of M #M′, σ |= ¬A from Definition 22 we conclude the proof
of (1).
For parts (2)-(5) the proof goes by application of the corresponding definitions from
22. Compare also with appendix G.

.
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Lemma 3 (Assertions are classical-2). For assertions A, A′, and A′′ the following
equivalences hold
1. A ∧ ¬A ≡ false
2. A ∨ ¬A ≡ true
3. A ∧A′ ≡ A′ ∧A
4. A ∨A′ ≡ A′ ∨A
5. (A ∨A′) ∨A′′ ≡ A ∨ (A′ ∨A′′)
6. (A ∨A′) ∧A′′ ≡ (A ∧A′) ∨ (A ∧A′′)
7. (A ∧A′) ∨A′′ ≡ (A ∨A′) ∧ (A ∨A′′)
8. ¬(A ∧A′) ≡ ¬A ∨ ¬A′′
9. ¬(A ∨A′) ≡ ¬A ∧ ¬A′
10. ¬(∃x.A) ≡ ∀x.(¬A)
11. ¬(∃S : SET.A) ≡ ∀S : SET.(¬A)
12. ¬(∀x.A) ≡ ∃x.¬(A)
13. ¬(∀S : SET.A) ≡ ∃S : SET.¬(A)
Proof. All points follow by application of the corresponding definitions from 22. Com-
pare also with appendix G. 
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C Exemplar: Bank Account
class Bank{
method newAccount(amt){
if (amt>=0) then{
return new Account(this,amt)
} }
}
class Account{
field balance
field myBank
method deposit(src,amt){
if (amt>=0 && src.myBank=this.myBank && src.balance>=amt)
then{
this.balance = this.balance+amt
src.balance = src.balance-amt
} }
method makeAccount(amt){
if (amt>=0 && this.balance>=amt) then{
this.balance = this.balance - amt;
return new Account(this.myBank,amt)
} }
}
Figure 6. MBA1: Implementation of Bank and Account – version 1
In this section we revisit the Bank/Account example from 2, and show two dif-
ferent implementations, derived from Noble et al. [49] . Both implementations satisfy
the three functional specifications and the holistic assertions (1), (2) and (3) shown in
section 2. The first version gives rise to runtime configurations as σ1, shown on the
left side of Fig. 2, while the second version gives rise to runtime configurations as σ2,
shown on the right side of Fig. 2. in the main text.
In this code, we use more syntax than the minimal syntax defined for Loo in Def.
11, as we use conditionals, and we allow nesting of expressions, e.g. a field read to be
the receiver of a method call. Such extension can easily be encoded in the base syntax.
MBA1, the fist version is shown Fig. 6. It keeps all the information in the Account
object: namely, the Account contains the pointer to the bank, and the balance, while
the Bank is a pure capability, which contains no state but is necessary for the creation
of new Accounts. In this version we have no ghost fields.
MBA1, the second version is shown Fig. 9 and 7. It keeps all the information in the
ledger: each Node points to an Account and contains the balance for this particular
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class Bank{
field ledger // a Node
method deposit(dest,src,amt){
destNd = this.ledger.find(dest)
srcNd = this.ledger.find(src)
srcBalance = srcNd.getBalance()
if ( destNd =/=null && srcNd=/=null && srcBalance>=amt &&
amt >=0 ) then
destNd.addToBalance(amt)
srcNc.addToBalance(-amt)
} }
method newAccount(amt){
if (amt>=0) then{
newAcc = new Account(this);
this.ledger = new Node(amt,this.ledger,newAcc)
return newAcc
} }
ghost balance(acc){ this.ledger.balance(acc) }
}
Figure 7. MBA2: Implementation of Bank – version 2
Account. Here balance is a ghost field of Account; the body of that declaration
calls the ghost field function balanceOf of the Bank which in its turn calls the ghost
field function balanceOf of the Node. Note that the latter is recursively defined.
Note also that Node exposes the function addToBalance(...); a call to this
function modifies the balance of an Account without requiring that the caller has
access to the Account. This might look as if it contradicted assertions (1) and (2)
from section 2. However, upon closer inspection, we see that the assertion is satisfied.
Remember that we employ a two-module semantics, where any change in the balance of
an account is observed from one external state, to another external state. By definition,
a configuration is external if its receiver is external. However, no external object will
ever have access to a Node, and therefore no external object will ever be able to call
the method addToBalance(...). In fact, we can add another assertion, (4), which
promises that any internal object which is externally accessible is either a Bank or an
Account.
(4) , ∀o,∀o′.[ external〈o 〉 ∧ ¬(external〈o′ 〉) ∧ 〈o accesso′ 〉
−→ [ o : Account ∨ o′ : Bank ] ]
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class Node{
field balance
field next
field myAccount
method addToBalance(amt){
this.balance = this.balance + amt
}
method find(acc){
if this.myAccount == acc then{
return this
} else {
if this.next==null then{
return null
} else {
return this.next.find(acc)
} } }
method getBalance(){ return balance }
ghost balance(acc){
if (this.myAccount == acc) then this.balance
else ( if this.next==null then -1 else this.next.
find(acc) )
}
}
Figure 8. MBA2: Implementation of Node – version 2
class Account{
field myBank
method deposit{src,amt){
this.myBank.deposit(this,src,amt)
} }
method makeAccount(amt){
if (amt>=0 && this.balance>=amt) then{
newAcc = this.myBank.makeNewAccount(0)
newAcc.deposit(this,amt)
return newAcc
} }
ghost balance(){ this.myBank.balance(this) }
}
Figure 9. MBA2: Implementation of Account – version 2
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D Examplar: Authorising ERC20
ERC20 [61] is a widely used token standard which describes the basic functionality ex-
pected by any Ethereum-based token contract. It issues and keeps track of participants’
tokens, and supports the transfer of tokens between participants. Transfer of tokens can
take place only provided that there were sufficient tokens in the owner’s account, and
that the transfer was instigated by the owner, or by somebody authorized by the owner.
We specify this in Chainmail as follows: A decrease in a participant’s balance
can only be caused by a transfer instigated by the account holder themselves
(i.e. 〈p calls ....transfer( ...) 〉), or by an authorized transfer instigated by another
participant p′′ (i.e. 〈p′′ calls ...transferFrom( ..) 〉) who has authority for more than
the tokens spent (i.e.e.allowed(p,p′′) ≥ m)
∀e : ERC20.∀p : Object.∀m,m′ : Nat.
[ e.balance(p) = m+ m’ ∧ next〈e.balance(p) = m′ 〉
−→
∃p′,p′′ : Object.
[ 〈p callse.transfer( p′,m) 〉 ∨
e.allowed(p,p′′) ≥ m ∧ 〈p′′ callse.transferFrom( p′,m) 〉 ]
]
That is to say: if next configuration witnesses a decrease of p’s balance by m, then the
current configuration was a call of transfer instigated by p, or a call of transferFrom
instigated by somebody authorized by p. The term e.allowed(p,p′′), means that the
ERC20 variable e holds a field called allowed which maps pairs of participants to
numbers; such mappings are supported in Solidity[17].
We now define what it means for p′ to be authorized to spend up to m tokens on
p’s behalf: At some point in the past, p gave authority to p′ to spend m plus the sum of
tokens spent so far by p′ on the behalf of p.
∀e : ERC20.∀p,p’ : Object.∀m : Nat.
[ e.allowed(p,p′) = m
−→
Prev〈 〈p callse.approve( p′,m) 〉
∨
e.allowed(p,p′) = m ∧
¬( 〈p′ callse.transferFrom( p, _) 〉 ∨ 〈p callse.approve( p, _) 〉 )
∨
∃p′′ : Object.∃m’ : Nat.
[ e.allowed(p,p′) = m+m′ ∧ 〈p′ callse.transferFrom( p′′,m′) 〉]
〉
]
In more detail p′ is allowed to spend up to m tokens on their behalf of p, if in the
previous step either a) p made the call approve on e with arguments p′ and m, or b)
p′ was allowed to spend up to m tokens for p and did not transfer any of p’s tokens, nor
did p issue a fresh authorization, or c) p was authorized for m+ m′ and spent m′.
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Thus, the holistic specification gives to account holders an "authorization-guarantee":
their balance cannot decrease unless they themselves, or somebody they had authorized,
instigates a transfer of tokens. Moreover, authorization is not transitive: only the account
holder can authorise some other party to transfer funds from their account: authorisa-
tion to spend from an account does not confer the ability to authorise yet more others
to spend also.
With traditional specifications, to obtain the "authorization-guarantee", one would
need to inspect the pre- and post- conditions of all the functions in the contract, and
determine which of the functions decrease balances, and which of the functions affect
authorizations. In the case of the ERC20, one would have to inspect all eight such
specifications (given in appendix D.1), where only five are relevant to the question at
hand. In the general case, e.g. the DAO, the number of functions which are unrelated to
the question at hand can be very large.
More importantly, with traditional specifications, nothing stops the next release of
the contract to add, e.g. , a method which allows participants to share their authority, and
thus violate the "authorization-guarantee", or even a super-user from skimming 0.1%
from each of the accounts.
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D.1 Example – ERC20, the traditional specification
We compare the holistic and the traditional specification of ERC20
As we said earlier, the holistic specification gives to account holders an "authorization-
guarantee": their balance cannot decrease unless they themselves, or somebody they had
authorized, instigates a transfer of tokens. Moreover, authorization is not transitive: only
the account holder can authorise some other party to transfer funds from their account:
authorisation to spend from an account does not confer the ability to authorise yet more
others to spend also.
With traditional specifications, to obtain the "authorization-guarantee", one would
need to inspect the pre- and post- conditions of all the functions in the contract, and
determine which of the functions decrease balances, and which of the functions affect
authorizations. In Figure 10 we outline a traditional specification for the ERC20. We
give two speficiations for transfer, another two for tranferFrom, and one for all
the remaining functions. The first specification says, e.g. , that if p has sufficient tokens,
and it calls transfer, then the transfer will take place. The second specification says
that if p has insufficient tokens, then the transfer will not take place (we assume that in
this specification language, any entities not mentioned in the pre- or post-condition are
not affected).
Similarly, we would have to give another two specifications to define the behaviour
of if p” is authorized and executes transferFrom, then the balance decreases. But
they are implicit about the overall behaviour and the necessary conditions, e.g., what
are all the possible actions that can cause a decrease of balance?
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e : ERC20 ∧ p,p” : Object ∧ m,m′,m′′ : Nat ∧
e.balance(p) = m+ m′ ∧ e.balance(p”) = m′′ ∧ this = p
{ e.transfer(p”,m’) }
e.balance(p) = m ∧ e.balance(p”) = m′′ + m′
e : ERC20 ∧ p,p’ : Object ∧ m,m′,m′′ : Nat ∧ e.balance(p) = m ∧ m < m′
{ e.transfer(p’,m’) }
e.balance(p) = m
e : ERC20 ∧ p,p’,p′′ : Object ∧ m,m′,m′′,m′′′ : Nat ∧
e.balance(p) = m+ m′ ∧ e.allowed(p,p’) = m′′′ + m′ ∧
e.balance(p”) = m′′ ∧ this = p’
{ e.transferFrom(p’,p”,m’) }
e.balance(p) = m ∧ e.balance(p”) = m′′ + m′ ∧ e.allowed(p,p’) = m′′′
e : ERC20 ∧ p,p’ : Object ∧ m,m′,m′′ : Nat ∧ this = p′ ∧
( e.balance(p) = m ∧ m < m′′ ∨ e.allowed(p,p’) = m’ ∧ m’ < m′′ )
{ e.transferFrom(p,p”,m”) }
e.balance(p) = m ∧ e.allowed(p,p’) = m’
e : ERC20 ∧ p,p’ : Object ∧ m : Nat ∧ this = p
{ e.approve(p’,m’) }
e.allowed(p,p’) = m
e : ERC20 ∧ m : Nat ∧ p.balance = m
{ k = e.balanceOf(p) }
k = m ∧ e.balanceOf(p) = m
e : ERC20 ∧ m : Nat ∧ e.allowed(p,p’) = m
{ k = e.allowance(p,p’) }
k = m ∧ e.allowed(p,p’) = m
e : ERC20 ∧ m : Nat ∧ ∑p∈dom(e.balance) e.balance(p) = m
{ k = e.totalSupply() }
k = m
Figure 10. Classical specification for the ERC20
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E Examplar: Defending the DAO
The DAO (Decentralised Autonomous Organisation) [13] is a famous Ethereum con-
tract which aims to support collective management of funds, and to place power directly
in the hands of the owners of the DAO rather than delegate it to directors. Unfortunately,
the DAO was not robust: a re-entrancy bug exploited in June 2016 led to a loss of $50M,
and a hard-fork in the chain [16]. With holistic specifications we can write a succinct
requirement that a DAO contract should always be able to repay any owner’s money.
Any contract which satisfies such a holistic specification cannot demonstrate the DAO
bug.
Our specification consists of three requirements. First, that the DAO always holds at
least as much money as any owner’s balance. To express this we use the field balances
which is a mapping from participants’s addresses to numbers. Such mapping-valued
fields exist in Solidity, but they could also be taken to be ghost fields [12].
∀d : DAO.∀p : Any.∀m : Nat.
[ d.balances(p) = m −→ d.ether ≥ m ]
Second, that when an owner asks to be repaid, she is sent all her money.
∀d : DAO.∀p : Any.∀m : Nat.
[ d.balance(p) = m ∧ 〈p callsd.repay( _) 〉
−→ will〈 〈d callssend.p( m) 〉 〉 ]
Third, that the balance of an owner is a function of the its balance in the previous step,
or the result of it joining the DAO, or asking to be repaid etc..
∀d : DAO.∀p.∀ : m : Nat.
[ d.Balance(p) = m −→ [ prev〈 〈p callsd.repay( _) 〉 〉 ∧ m = 0 ∨
prev〈 〈p callsd.join( m) 〉 〉 ∨
... ]
]
More cases are needed to reflect the financing and repayments of proposals, but they
can be expressed with the concepts described so far.
The requirement that d holds at least m ether precludes the DAO bug, in the sense that
any contract satisfying that spec cannot exhibit the bug: a contract which satisfies the
spec is guaranteed to always have enough money to satisfy all repay requests. This
guarantee holds, regardless of how many functions there are in the DAO. In contrast, to
preclude the DAO bug with a classical spec, one would need to write a spec for each
of the DAO functions (currently 19), a spec for each function of the auxiliary contracts
used by the DAO, and then study their emergent behaviour.
These 19 DAO functions have several different concerns: who may vote for a pro-
posal, who is eligible to submit a proposal, how long the consultation period is for
deliberating a proposal, what is the quorum, how to chose curators, what is the value of
a token, Of these groups of functions, only a handful affect the balance of a participant.
Holistic specifications allow us to concentrate on aspect of DAO’s behaviour across all
its functions.
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F Examplar: Attenuating the DOM
Attenuation is the ability to provide to third party objects restricted access to an ob-
ject’s functionality. This is usually achieved through the introduction of an intermediate
object. While such intermediate objects are a common programming practice, the term
was coined, and the practice was studied in detail in the object capabilities literature,
e.g. [40].
The key structure underlying a web browser is the Domain Object Model (DOM),
a recursive composite tree structure of objects that represent everything display in a
browser window. Each window has a single DOM tree which includes both the page’s
main content and also third party content such as advertisements. To ensure third party
content cannot affect a page’s main content, specifications for attenuation for the DOM
were proposed in Devriese et al: [21].
This example deals with a tree of DOM nodes: Access to a DOM node gives access
to all its parent and children nodes, and the ability to modify the node’s properties.
However, as the top nodes of the tree usually contain privileged information, while the
lower nodes contain less crucial third-party information, we want to be able to limit
access given to third parties to only the lower part of the DOM tree. We do this through
a Wrapper, which has a field node pointing to a Node, and a field height which
restricts the range of Nodes which may be modified through the use of the particular
Wrapper. Namely, when you hold a Wrapper you can modify the property of all
the descendants of the height-th ancestors of the node of that particular Wtrapper.
In Figure 11 we show an example of the use of Wrapper objects attenuating the use
of Nodes The function usingWrappers takes as parameter an object of unknown
provenance, here called unknwn. On lines 2-7 we create a tree consisting of nodes n1,
n2, ... n6, depicted as blue circles on the right-hand-side of the Figure. On line 8 we
create a wrapper of n5 with height 1. This means that the wrapper w may be used to
modify n3, n5 and n6 (i.e. the objects in the green triangle), while it cannot be used
to modify n1, n2, and 4 (i.e. the objects within the blue triangle). On line 8 we call a
function named untrusted on the unknown object, and pass w as argument.
Even though we know nothing about the unknown object or its untrusted func-
tion, and even though the call gives to unknown access to w, which in turn has transitive
access to all Node-s in the tree, we know that line 100 will not affect the property
fields of the nodes n1, n2, and n4. Thus, the assertion on line 12 is guaranteed to suc-
ceed. The question is how do we specify Wrapper, so as to be able to make such an
argument.
A specification of the class Wrapper in the traditional style, e.g. [31] consists of
pairs of pre- and post- conditions for each of the functions of that class. Each such
pair gives a sufficient condition for some effect to take place: for example the call
w.setProperty(i,prp) where i is smaller than w.height is a sufficient con-
dition to modify property of the i-th parent of w.node. But we do not know what
other ways there may be to modify a node’s property. In other words, we have not
specified the necessary conditions. In our example:
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method usingWrappers(unknwn)
{
n1=Node(null,"fixed");
n2=Node(n1,"robust");
n3=Node(n2,"const");
n4=Node(n3,"volatile");
n5=Node(n4,"variable");
n6=Node(n5,"ethereal");
w=Wrapper(n5,1);
unknwn.untrusted(w);
assert n2.property=="
robust"
...
}
n5
n1
n6
n2
n4n3unknwn
w 
Figure 11. Wrappers protecting Nodes
The necessary condition for the modification of nd.property for some nd
of class Node is either access to some Node in the same tree, or access to a w
of class Wrapper where the w.height-th parent of w is an ancestor of nd.
With such a specification we can prove that the assertion on line 12 will succeed.
And, more importantly, we can ensure that all future updates of the Wrapper abstract
data type will uphold the protection of the Node data. To give a flavour of Chainmail,
we use it express the requirement from above:
∀S : Set.∀nd : Node.∀o : Object.
[
〈will〈 changes〈nd.property 〉 〉 inS 〉
−→
∃o.[ o ∈ S ∧ ¬(o : Node) ∧ ¬(o : Wrapper) ∧
[ ∃nd′ : Node.〈o accessnd′ 〉 ∨
∃w : Wrapper.∃k :N.( 〈o accessw 〉 ∧ nd.parntk=w.node.parntw.height) ] ]
]
That is, if the value of nd.property is modified (changes〈 _ 〉) at some future point
(will〈 _ 〉) and if reaching that future point involves no more objects than those from
set S (i.e. 〈 _ inS 〉), then at least one (o) of the objects in S is not a Node nor a
Wrapper, and o has direct access to some node (〈o accessnd′ 〉), or to some wrap-
per w and the w.height-th parent of w is an ancestor of nd (that is, parntk =
w.node.parntw.height). Note that our “access” is intransitive: 〈x access y 〉 holds
if either x has a field pointing to y, or x is the receiver and y is one of the arguments in
the executing method call.
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G Coq Formalism
In this section we present the properties of Chainmail that have been formalised in the
Coq model. Table 1 refers to proofs that can be found in the associated Coq formalism
[2].
Lemma 1 (and 3) Properties of Linking
(1) moduleLinking_associative
(2) moduleLinking_commutative_1
(3) moduleLinking_commutative_2
(4) linking_preserves_reduction
Lemma 2
(1) A ∧ ¬A ≡ false
(2) A ∨ ¬A ≡ true
(3) A ∨ A′ ≡ A′ ∧ A
(4) A ∧ A′ ≡ A′ ∧ A
(5) (A ∨ A′) ∨ A′′ ≡ A ∨ (A′ ∨ A′′)
(1) sat_and_nsat_equiv_false
(2) -
(3) and_commutative
(4) or_commutative
(5) or_associative
Lemma 3
(1) A ∧ ¬A ≡ false
(2) A ∨ ¬A ≡ true
(3) A ∨ A′ ≡ A′ ∧ A
(4) A ∧ A′ ≡ A′ ∧ A
(5) (A ∨ A′) ∨ A′′ ≡ A ∨ (A′ ∨ A′′)
(6) (A ∨ A′) ∧ A′′ ≡ (A ∨ A′′) ∧ (A′ ∨ A′′)
(7) (A ∧ A′) ∨ A′′ ≡ (A ∧ A′′) ∨ (A′ ∧ A′′)
(8) ¬(A ∧ A′) ≡ (¬A ∨ ¬A′)
(9) ¬(A ∨ A′) ≡ (¬A ∧ ¬A′)
(10) ¬(∃x.A) ≡ ∀x.(¬A)
(11) ¬(∃S.A) ≡ ∀S.(¬A)
(12) ¬(∀x.A) ≡ ∃x.(¬A)
(13) ¬(∀S.A) ≡ ∃S.(¬A)
(1) sat_and_nsat_equiv_false
(2) -
(3) and_commutative
(4) or_commutative
(5) or_associative
(6) and_distributive
(7) or_distributive
(8) neg_distributive_and
(9) neg_distributive_or
(10) not_ex_x_all_not
(11) not_ex_Σ_all_not
(12) not_all_x_ex_not
(13) not_all_Σ_ex_not
Table 1. Chainmail Properties Formalised in Coq
